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SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

In a series of earlier works, Jean-Paul Sartre in the essay *Transcendence of the ego* takes a considerable undertaking of philosophical independence because it develops a phenomenological theory of consciousness that is not only inspired by the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, but at the same time an immanent critique of the same. In this essay, Sartre criticizes Husserl's new transcendental-phenomenological concept, advocating a return to research achievements from *Logical Research*. The most prominent meta criticism is the transcendental ego, which Sartre holds to Husserl in the *Ideas of Transcendental Phenomenology* as the necessary pole of subjectivism that subordinates our experience. Sartre points out that such a transcendental approach is not only needed, but is ultimately even incompatible with Husserl's theory of consciousness developed in the earlier writings. Therefore, Sartre reinterprets the role and status of the ego, rejecting this transcendental concept for its theory of a completely empirical transcendental ego. How exactly this criticism looks and what Sartre implies under the term "transcendent ego" will be explained in this chapter. The essay *Transformation Ego* was published as an expert-scientific paper that does not explain the premises from which it moves because Sartre proceeds from the assumption that the reader is already familiar with the foundations of Husserl's phenomenology. For the sake of clarity, the main premise in this paper will be particularly prominent. It is a record of the data of one's own conscious experiences, which Husserl calls "Cartesian certainty" in *Logical Research*, demanding from his phenomenology that he has a strictly scientific character modeled on the scientific claims of Descartes's statement "cogito, ergo sum". In this work, Husserl notes that conscious experiences are "evident only in their living intent, which cannot be adequately communicated with words" (Husserl, 2001). Sartre, therefore, starts from the premise that consciousness is marked by a direct record of its own experiences, creating a methodological syncretism of the Cartesian first truth and the Husserlian "return to the very things". The stronghold is my direct and undoubtedly conscious experience. Methodologically, therefore, he does not question the record of his own experiences, but he examines the way in which they give us their own. The question therefore is: "(...) Is the One we encounter in our consciousness enabled by the synthetic unity of our imaginations, or does it unite the conceptions among ourselves?" (Sartre, 1981).

Sartre in the late philosophy of Husserl sees a problematic answer to this question, since Husserl postulates a transcendental self which he understands as the necessary condition for the possibility of cognition, skipping simply the aforementioned question. While Kant of the transcendental self in the *Critical of the Clear Mind* speaks of "the highest synthesis of experience," portraying him as the greatest possible abstraction, Husserl sees in the notion that I is more rigidly seeing a transcendental principle that recognizes the methodological undertaking of the epoch as a necessary condition for the synthesis of our experience. It's not about one of the many conditions for cognition, but about the specific sex to which the experience relates. Husserl does not explain the description by the description of the self, but assumes it as a transcendental sex that organizes the plurality of experiences by uniting them into consciousness. But as it will be shown at the end of this chapter, it is not Husserl's intention: while Husserl sees in the transcendental one, I see the necessary condition for experience, which I am referring to with the reflexive, methodological undertaking of the epoch, Sartre sees in him the apropos of the principle that constitutes consciousness. Husserl is interested in what will be recorded at the level of reflection as a necessary condition for the synthetic unity of consciousness, while Sartre is interested in the ontogenesis of consciousness and myself. Instead of being satisfied with Husserl's methodological cataloging of what reflections reveal, Sartre goes a step further, asking the question of the origin and the constitution of consciousness and myself. Sartre's criticism, therefore, is simultaneously immanent as well as the external critique of Husserl. It does not criticize Husserl exclusively within the methodological framework of transcendental phenomenology, but starts from the original idea of a particular phenomenology.



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Thus, Sartre criticizes the ego-logical constellation of consciousness that we encounter in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl, asking whether consciousness experiences require a unifying function of this transcendental ego. Therefore, it is his task to show how the conscious experiences can be organized into the overall impression the subject raises. Solving this problem, Sartre finds in the concept of transversal intentionality, developed by Husserl in his work *Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* to explain how awareness in the context of time constructs awareness of duration. This property can be illustrated by the example of a melody, because we can only tone the tone as a series of tones if it is possible to synthesize the past and current, but also the future or expected tones. When we talk about the presence of past tones that actively shape the perception of the present moment, we are talking about retention. A series of sounds in this way becomes a continuum that we perceive as a whole that we call a melody. The end of the melody is marked by the expectation of the final tone, and this focus on the future, thereby interfering with the present, calls Husserl a protest. As Prechtl argues, it does not work there is so much difficulty as to understand the difficulty of how difficult the situation is in presenting the presence of past impressions in the present moment in everyday speech (Prechtl, 1998, p. 94). Zahavi explains this in the following way: "Let's imagine that we are listening to a triad consisting of the tones of C, D and E. If we focus on the last part of that discourse, the one that appears when the tone E rings, we find no consciousness that is solely aware of the tone E but the consciousness that is still always aware of the two previous notes, D and C. (...) These were the tones that were, and were perceived as passed, which is why we can really experience the triage in time, not just as isolated tones that suddenly change one another. We can observe time items because consciousness is not captured in the present. We are not only observing the present phase of the triumph, but also its past and future phases" (Zahavi, 2001). By means of this concept, Sartre in the *Transcendence of the Ego* concludes: "Self consciousness is united specifically through the game of transversal intentionality which are concrete real retention of past consciousness. In this way, consciousness is constantly returning to it; who says the consciousness says total consciousness, and this unique attribute belongs to the very consciousness, whatever it was, after all, its relationship with I" (Sartre, 1949). Consciousness therefore has no need for a transcendental ego that will unite a multitude of conscious acts. The individualization of consciousness is the property of consciousness itself; it is intentional, and it is united by an intentional act, transcending itself. The melody is transcendent with a multitude of amorphous sounds, combining certain conscious experiences, forming a meaningful whole. This unity is given to us in the form of an overall impression of one particular melody. Some tones, therefore, are perceived in synthetic integrity so that a melody can be perceived. Consciousness always appears as the synthetic integrity already achieved, and as already indicated, this phenomenon of consciousness is pre-personal; she does not have a need for ego. Refuting the transcendental ego with the rationale that consciousness does not have the need for transcendental sex that unites a multitude of conscious experiences is not only Sartre's attempt to reject superfluous concepts, developing his theory according to the principle of some conceptual economy. His critique is based on two points, namely, on the superfluity of the transcendental ego and on its detriment. The most important part of his criticism is not based on the excess of this transcendental ego, but on his detriment to the whole conception of consciousness. The fundamental question, therefore, is not to say whether it is necessary to postulate the transcendental ego, but whether such an egology is still compatible with the conception of consciousness developed by Husserl in the earlier writings: "Since (Husserl, 2001) has considered the view that I was synthetic and the transcendent product of consciousness, he returned in the *Ideas* again to the classical thesis of transcendental Self, which would be like in the background of any consciousness, which would be a necessary structure of this consciousness, whose rays would fall to every phenomenon that appeared in the field of attention. In this way, transcendental consciousness becomes strictly personal. Was this concept necessary? Is it compatible with Husserl's definition of consciousness?"



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"The key notion of this critique is the transparency of consciousness, the expression absolute and completely according to the intentional content of the directed transcendence of consciousness.

Therefore, consciousness, because of its intentional structure, exhausts completely in the transcendence of itself, posing as a complete presence in the intended objects; "All consciousness is an awareness of something," Husserl says. Consciousness is therefore transparent and without substance. The unity of all conscious acts does not initiate the subject of a specific transcendental structure, but objects that we are aware of. Various conscious acts are absorbed in the intentional object, as was shown on the example of a melody that appears as the synthetic integrity of the experienced tones; in order to make it sound in the form of a melody, a synthetic unity of past acts is needed in the form of one consciousness. The perception of consciousness as it is encountered in Sartre carries holistic features. Whereas the acts of consciousness are technical terms that signify the integrity of conscious experiences in an intentional object, we can perceive consciousness as the highest synthesis of all these conscious acts; conscious acts are part of the theoretical model and we are not separately conscious of them, while consciousness is exactly the way we are conscious of this plurality in the form of a conscious whole. Their relationship is similar to the relationship between tone and melody. The latter can be broken down into tones, although we are aware of them in the context of a particular melody. What Sartre wants to avoid is the need for a transcendental ego that would create a synthesis of conscious acts, uniting them in a transcendental unity of consciousness, because everything except autodynamics consciousness that itself unites in intentional objects assumes the duality of the subject and object. Refusal Brentano distinction between immanent and transcendent intentional content of consciousness followed by Husserl's Logical Investigations in which Sartre draws when criticizing Brentano model immanent intentional content. The Brentan model is experiencing difficulties because the experience is a phenomenon. One such epistemological structure of consciousness is irreconcilable with the Cartesian certainty of one's own conscious experiences, because it is aware of the perception of an object that appears to the subject. As Husserl has already said, "the occurrences themselves do not appear, they are perceived" (Husserl, 2001). If the experience of some consciousness is immanent, in the form of a phenomenon, it is always necessary to postulate an additional awareness that will experience it, and since it will also act as a phenomenon, it is an endless recourse. The experience is therefore not an immanent consciousness, but consciousness fully appears as an experience. Since consciousness does not have the need for transcendental Self, that it is fully focused on objects, and that it is completely exhausted as an experience, it is completely transparent; it is nothing more than a presence in things that is absolutely uncontaminated by immanent content.

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