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THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

Kant's philosophy marks a milestone in the rise of western thought. It is possible to agree with Henry that Kant's revolution was reluctant. The question, however, is whether to talk about a milestone or milestones, since the critical philosophy has changed philosophy in many ways and in many different dimensions. The point of departure of all these ways and dimensions is the notion of freedom. Kant does not start with the philosophical point of view of the notion of freedom. However, the philosophy of philosophy as a philosophy of freedom and the view of freedom in the multiple nature of its objections as the fundamental provision of that human has its own place of birth in Kant's critical project. Copernican crafts and the founding of transcendental philosophy do not belong to the so-called gnoseological side of philosophy in the original, but in the derivative sense. In its intrinsic sense, the project of transcendental philosophy is a project of freedom. The interpretative position that follows the triple coverage of the concept of freedom in Kant must be retained, first of all, on the ontological and practical side. In the ontological foundation of freedom, Kant's teaching of freedom as a transcendental idea paves the way for all subsequent interventions into the essence of the ontological dimension of freedom. Likewise, the autonomy of will remain the fundamental determinant of the practical notion of freedom in all Kant's idealist successors. However, the ultimate concept of freedom remains with Kant underdeveloped. The reason for this rudimentary nature rests on the inconsistency of the very concept of freedom itself, which essentially excludes all forms of freedom other than moral. In its first idealistic form, the notion of freedom shows its origin from the notion of subjectivity. Hence, Kant's understanding of freedom must necessarily begin with the thematisation of the problem of subjectivity in his philosophy, just as it must be the beginning of the thematisation of the notion of freedom in German idealism as such. In one place in the *Critical Mind Clearness*, Kant expresses the position in which the essence of modern philosophy and the civil world is embodied: A constitution that would encompass the greatest human freedom through laws that would make the freedom of each individual possible along with the freedom of all other people not the greatest bliss since it will come only with itself) is nevertheless at least one necessary idea from which it must go not only in the first draft of a state constitution, but in all laws, and in the beginning it must abstract from the given obstacles which may not arise inevitably so much from a human nature as, on the contrary, from the fact that the real ideas are ignored in the legislation.

Putting man at the center of thought by emphasizing the principle of subjectivity, the indications already seen in humanism and renaissance, finds its full novel expression in Descartes's philosophy. In Kant's critical philosophy, however, this principle is set as the principle precisely by the fact that he himself puts himself under the question mark. In December, subjectivity was thought to be the best foundation, at Kant as the foundation that founded itself. As stated by Hegel, this principled difference is made possible by Kant's attempt to illuminate the nature of the subjectivity itself, instead of leaving it beyond the reach of methodological doubt. The establishment of critical philosophy rests on the transcendental provision: "I call transcendental every knowledge that does not deal with objects, but our knowledge of a subject, if it should be a priori". In this provision transcendental philosophy is legitimized as a "system of all principles of pure mind". According to Erdmann on the trail of the question that opened up the novel philosophy, Kant will sharpen the problem of subjectivity to the point where the so-called "real world" evolves into the human world, leaving the question of understanding reality beyond the possibility of consideration. The incompleteness of this evolution, embodied in the concept of "things by itself", makes up the very limit of Kant's philosophy and transcendental idealism as such. The basic task of Kant's philosophy is to establish a system of all principles of pure mind, that is, to set philosophy as a transcendental one. The task demanded, first and foremost, a direction towards the cognitive powers itself and the release of all empirical contents. Such a process can lead to a false, epistemological trace in which Kant's task would be understood as a test of cognitive powers, not an examination of the power of freedom. The capital's original idea of Kant's transcendentalism is contained in the thesis that knowledge is nothing but a special way of the existence of freedom.



THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

Cognition as a way of the existence of freedom rests on the dialectiveness of freedom and necessity. Kant did not manage to think this relationship to the end speculatively, but his freedom and necessity remained in constant aporetic confrontation. Cognition rests on the forms of sensibility, reason and mind. Indeed, sensibility, reason and mind are the basic powers of the human soul as the power of human freedom: "Every human knowledge begins with perceptions, from there it goes to concepts and ends with ideas." The sensibility examines transcendental aesthetics, the sense of transcendental analytics, and the mind transcendental dialectics, with the latter two falling into transcendental logic. The power of trial, as a "higher cognitive power", also falls within the framework of transcendental logic, although it is systematically processed within a particular critique. Starting from the idea that "we only invent a priori of things just what we are investing in ourselves," Kant develops an analysis of a priori forms of sensibility, reason and mind, seeking to gain full insight into what subjectivity invests in objectively. Already in this attitude, Kant's understanding of cognition as a freedom is held: only what is the work of free manufacturing power can be recognized! Ghost and reason are the basic sources of human knowledge, "two trees of human knowledge," without whose cooperation no experience is possible at all, while the mind does not take direct part in the knowledge, it already has a very special role. The a priori forms of sensibility are the ways in which objects are given to us in experience - all that can be the object of experience given to us through space and time. Space is the form of all the phenomena of external senses, i.e. "The subjective condition of the sensibility under which external observation is only possible for us", while the time of the form of the inner sense and thus "a condition and a priori of all occurrences in general". Both space and time bear the signs of empirical reality and transcendental ideality: they refer to objects only when objects are perceived as phenomena, and not by assuming them as things by themselves. If something is given in experience, space and time are the ways in which it is given - hence the empirical realities. The limit of possible experience, however, is the limit of space and time - hence the transcendental ideality. The a priori forms of sensibility, as well as a priori forms of reason, and especially the mind, are the categories of freedom par excellence. Although Kant under categories of freedom implies a special thought of the practical mind, it must be pointed out that the very concept of a priori form, as Kant formulates, is the category of freedom. This possibility remains in Kant's philosophy unreformed and, therefore, undeveloped, but will acquire its full expression in Hegel's founding of the philosophy system. In addition to the sensitivity receptivity, the necessary condition of knowledge is spontaneity, i.e. mind as the ability of the spirit to produce performances. With the sentences that give the sensation, the concepts that give the reason are necessary ("thoughts without content are empty, observations without concepts are blind"). Categories are pure forms of reason or a priori terms. Jameson writes that, contrary to Aristotle's "objective" conception by which categories are directly perceived as important the characteristics of reality, Kant's category derives from the assumption of the logical functions of human reason, from the court table, that is, from the power of trial as a common principle. Kant distinguishes four basic types of categories - quantity, quality, relationship and modality - each of which contains three possible pure forms. Kant's concept of a category opens up an important question as to how it is possible at all that subjective terms of opinion have an objective value. In other words, how is it possible that categories are a condition of opportunity of all knowledge, since phenomena can be given in observation, independently of the functions of reason, i.e. independent of the categories? - The debate on this issue reveals the full meaning and value of Kant's philosophy. In it, for the first time, in the course of philosophy, the pure subjective principle is posed as a condition of objectivity. It is not only understood as a condition for the realization of reality, but essentially the possibility of its existence. Thus, as stated by Adorno, at the same time, it is freely placed as a condition of the necessary: The idealism of transcendental logic is proved in its most vital core as the idealism of moral (sittlichen) consciousness and only through it becomes the idealism of consciousness in general.



THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

Although this is the foundation of critical philosophy, Kant always speaks of the condition of the possibility of knowing, although the leading question is raised: How can we, by doing so, prescribe the nature of the law and, what is more, we make it possible. However, owing to the difference between the phenomenon and the things in itself, the condition of the possibility of knowledge becomes simultaneously the condition of the possibility of existence, since the world of phenomena of theoretical consciousness is in fact the world in general. The answer to the above question is transcendental deduction of the category, which shows that all the actions of reason, and therefore all knowledge, are based on an "act of spontaneity" called pure apperception. Kant set the idea of pure apperception as the pragmatic synthetic unity of apperception by deepening the Cartesian "I think," to the phrase "I think, who must be able to follow all my performances". The notion of apperception refers to the Leibniz solution to the problem of freedom of monks. By the attitude I think it is demonstrated that self-awareness is a necessary condition under which every observation must be "to become an object for me": "Transcendental unity of apperception is that unity that unifies all the diversity that is given in one observation into one concept of object." Thanks to the pragmatic synthetic unity of apperception, it is possible to apply pure concepts of reason to perceptions, which are conditioned by pure forms of sensibility, i.e. space and time. I think the foundation of all the concepts: "It is easy to see that this term is the solvent of all concepts in general," including transcendental. Kant argues that I also think of a transcendental term, although it cannot be assigned to him a special title that has other transcendental concepts, i.e. ideas. The reason for the lack of a special name is that "it serves only to show every thought as something that belongs to consciousness," and in some ways it is a general assumption of transcendental concepts themselves. Kant calls this notion a pure apperception, pure self-awareness, transcendental self-awareness.

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